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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates learning in games with one-sided incomplete information using 
laboratory data from a game which we call the game of Vertigo. The predicted Bayes­
N ash equilibrium behavior of the agents in this type of game generates overly strong 
restrictions on the data, including the zero likelihood problem: certain actions should 
never be observed. To circumvent statistical problems, and to allow for deviations from 
perfectly rational behavior, we introduce the possibility of players making errors when 
choosing their actions. We compare two competing models depending on whether play­
ers take the errors in actions into consideration when formulating their strategies. We 
also investigate possible deviations from Bayes's rule, producing too fast or too slow an 
updating rule. In total, we get six models of sophisticated and unsophisticated strategy 
formation on the first dimension, and fast, slow, or no updating on the second. We apply 
a fully Bayesian structural econometric approach to compare the statistical performance 
of these six models, and to obtain posterior estimates of several nuisance parameters 
governing the errors in actions. The two models where players are unsophisticated and 
either use no updating at all, or use dampened updating, have a much higher likelihood 
than any of the others. 
*We acknowledge the financial support from NSF grant #SES9011828 to the California
Institute of Technology and from the JPL-Caltech Supercomputing project. We have benefited 
from many discussions with Richard McKelvey. Marty Hahm wrote the computer programs for 
the experiment. 
VERTIGO: 
COMPARING STRUCTURAL MODELS OF IMPERFECT BEHAVIOR IN EXPERIMENTAL 
GAMES 
MAHMOUD A. EL-GAMAL AND THOMAS R. PALFREY 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper investigates learning in multistage games with one-sided incomplete informa­
tion using laboratory data. We focus on two issues related to possible deviations from 
behavior predicted by game theoretic models focused on perfectly rational behavior by 
Bayesian players. The first issue is imperfect choice behavior, and employs a model that 
generates an error structure that permits rigorous statistical analysis of the data. The 
second issue is imperfect learning behavior; agents' updating may be too fast or too slow 
in the existence of errors in actions. 
Recently, it has become increasingly clear that models of game behavior demanding 
perfect rationality of the players seem to perform poorly under the scrutiny of careful 
statistical analysis of data from simple finite game experiments. This is true whether 
the games are strictly competitive (Brown and Rosenthal (1990)) ,  have clear gains to
cooperative behavior (Camerer and Weigelt (1988), McKelvey and Palfrey (1992)) ,  or lie
in some intermediate territory Banks et al. (1988), Brandts and Holt (1989), and Palfrey 
and Rosenthal (1991), Palfrey and Rosenthal (1992)) .  One reason for the existence 
of these problems is that most equilibrium concepts are essentially static and fail to 
address basic issues of learning dynamics, information, and the cognitive limitations of 
the players. A second, related, reason is that these equilibrium concepts typically place 
overly strong restrictions on the data. In fact, for most of the games that have been 
experimentally investigated, the equilibrium predicts the use of pure strategies. More 
to the point, equilibrium models frequently predict that certain strategies will never be 
observed. In these cases, both classical and Bayesian statistical methods lead to outright 
rejection of strictly rational models. 
The predictions that certain strategies should never be observed may arise from a 
number of different scenarios ranging from the availability of dominant actions under 
certain circumstances, to very sophisticated updating rules resulting in full revelation 
of certain states of nature, and requiring particular pure strategies to be played (e.g.
Cooper et al. (1991), and El-Gama! et al. (1991)) .  The end result is that certain actions 
cannot be observed at certain points in time during the experiment. If those "infinitely 
unlikely" events are observed in experimental data (e.g. players choosing a dominated
action in Cooper et al. (1991)), one is faced with what we call the zero likelihood problem. 
A common, but statistically unsatisfactory way to deal with this problem is to ignore 
the zero-likelihood data points, treating them as missing data. Other popular procedures 
involve descriptive data analyses and the application of ad hoc measures of association 
or fit to compare the relative performance of several competing models. 
Several recent attempts have been made to endow the strict rationality models with 
an extra feature that allows all observations to occur with positive probability. This 
paper follows this approach, and evaluates and compares several different specific ways 
to do this in the context of a multistage game of incomplete information. The players 
are assumed to follow the theory as long as they do not "tremble"; and they tremble 
with some probability 0 < E < 1. When players tremble, they are assumed to choose 
their action in an arbitrary way which allows all possible actions to be chosen with some 
positive probability.1 The first question explored along this approach was what value of 
E to use. In Boylan and El-Gama! (1992)'s study of disequilibrium dynamics, the model 
comparison was done at all possible E's in [O, l], and in their case, the results held for al­
most all E (excluding those values arbitrarily close to 1). In McKelvey and Palfrey (1992), 
and Harless and Camerer (1992) ,  a value of E was estimated by its maximum likelihood 
estimator under the relevant model(s). In El-Gama! et al. (1991), the parameter E was 
viewed as a nuisance parameter, and hence, a prior was induced on E together with all 
other nuisance parameters of the models they studied, and this prior on E was updated 
as experimental data was collected. In this paper, we follow this fully Bayesian proce­
dure, by specifying a model with nuisance parameters, integrating out these nuisance 
parameters with respect to our beliefs, which are updated as more data are observed. 
The second issue that the introduction of the trembles poses is how players take it into 
account. In El-Gama! et al. (1991 ), and McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) ,  the trembles were 
assumed to come from a common knowledge distribution which the players incorporated 
in making their decisions. In this sense, the players were assumed to be very sophisticated 
in dealing with the fact that their opponents, as well as themselves, may tremble at any 
point in the game. They incorporated these probabilities of trembles in their strategies 
(mappings from beliefs to actions), as well as updating rules (mappings from beliefs and 
observed actions to beliefs). This very high degree of sophistication would seem to put an 
incredible computational burden on the players. In order to solve for the full sequential 
equilibrium of a three-move centipede game played with two opponents, El-Gama! et al. 
(1991) required 120 CPU hours of a fast supercomputer (a Cray Y-MP2E/116). It might 
seem odd to deviate from perfect rationality by introducing the trembles, and then require 
such a high level of rationality in dealing with the trembles to make it almost impossible 
to solve for the equilibrium behavior. Lower degrees of sophistication in dealing with the 
trembles may be more reasonable. 
This paper considers two levels of sophistication in the players' strategies. The so-
1There are alternative ways to introduce imperfect choice behavior. Besides this "trembling" model, 
we are stochastic utility models (Logit, Probit, etc.), imperfectly controlled preference models (Palfrey 
and Rosenthal (1992)), evolutionary models with 111utation, and iinperfect equilibrium models (Beja 
(1992)). This paper focuses only on a simple revision of the tremble model. 
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phisticated model lets the agents take into account the fact that they, as well as their 
opponents, can tremble at any time, and adjust for that fact when deciding on their 
strategies. The unsophisiicated model does not have the agents take account of the trem­
ble probabilities when formulating their best responses, i.e., they decide on their actions 
as if no one ever trembles. 
A second source of deviation from behavior predicted by Bayesian equilibrium, besides 
errors in actions, derives from errors in updating. The players may, to varying degrees, 
use available information in ways that are inconsistent with Bayes's rule. -we consider 
three alternative updating models. The first model (which we label the undampened or 
fast updating model) lets the agents update from the observed moves of their opponents 
via the Bayes updating map, not taking into account the fact that their opponents may 
have trembled. The second model (which we label the dampened updating model) lets the 
agents update from the observed moves taking into account the fact that they may have 
resulted from a tremble. The last model of updating we consider is the no updating model, 
where the players do not use the observed actions to adjust their beliefs. Combining the 
two models of sophistication with the three models of updating generates a total of six 
alternative models. 
We compare these models using a simple game of one-sided incomplete information, 
which we call the game of Vertigo. The informed player may be one of two-types, corre­
sponding two possible payoff tables of a bimatrix game, called game 1 and game 2. The 
games are equivalent, up to a relabeling of the players, so one may think of the private 
information being that the informed player knows whether he is the row player or the 
column player, but the uninformed player does not.2 The probability distribution of the 
informed player's type is common knowledge. No player has a dominant strategy in ei­
ther game 1 or game 2. There is a unique mixed-strategy equilibrium in each component 
game. 
The game of incomplete information also has a unique equilibrium, which depends on 
the common knowledge prior over the types. One type mixes, and the other type adopts 
a pure strategy. Which type mixes depends on the prior. 
In the experiment, each uninformed player plays a sequence of informed players, all 
of whom are the same type. The experimental procedures are organized in a manner 
that eliminates signaling possibilities by the informed (row) players. The next section 
will analyze the equilibrium of the game and describe the details of the experimental 
design and procedures. Section 3 lays out the six models embodying varying degrees of 
sophistication on the part of the players when accounting for the tremble probabilities 
in their strategies and updating rules. Section 4 presents the experimental results and 
our methods of data analysis, and discusses our ranking of the models that we consider. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2In the experiment, the two players know their labels, and the payoff entries for game two are the 
same as the payoff entries to game one, except they have been rotated counterclockwise by one cell in 
the table. Hence the name "Vertigo." This is equivalent to relabeling the players. 
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2 THE GAME OF VERTIGO: 
2.1 THE STAGE GAME: 
The Game of Vertigo is defined by the following two tables, called game 1 and game 2:
GAME I prob= 7r: I 
L R 
GAME II prob= (1 - 7r) : I 
L R 
In words, the players get to play Game I with probability 11", and Game II with probability 
(1 - 7r ) .  The values of 7r and relevant payoffs a1 and a2 are chosen by the experimenter.
This class of games was chosen so that each game has the typical structure of a 
two person game with an unique mixed strategy equilibrium. The equilibrium of each 
game also has a symmetry property: each player assigns mixing probabilities to their 
two strategies in ratios of p : 1 - p where p = a,"t.a,. These features of symmetry,
uniqueness, and lack of dominant strategies make the game one which is convenient from 
an analytical and statistical point of view, and which is sufficiently complex to warrant 
the introduction of trembles into the individual's choices. The game was also sufficiently 
abstract so that we hoped to avoid having our control of subjects' financial motivations 
contaminated by preconceived notions of fairness or altruism, as in prisoner's dilemma 
or public goods experiments. We also wished to avoid a structure of payoffs that led to 
multiple equilibria, as this would generate serious difficulties in the statistical comparison 
of the competing models. 
2.2 THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN: 
We study a 2n-person ( n :'.'.: 5) five-stage repeated game based on the vertigo stage game
defined above. There are n row players and n column players, who are seated at computer 
terminals which are separated by partitions. One payoff game is drawn according to the 
probability 7r before the beginning of stage 1. All row players in the room are informed
of the outcome of this random draw. In stages 1-5 each participant in the experiment 
plays the stage game against a sequence of five different opponents, always using the 
same payoff game that was drawn initially. 
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The matching sequence is constructed using the technique of McKelvey and Palfrey 
(1992), which guarantees within the five stage game that it is logically impossible for
a player's current move to have an effect on how that player's future opponents make 
choices in the later stages of the game. This is done by first labeling the players row 
player 1, row player 2, ... , row player n; column player 1, column player 2,. .. , column
player n. In stage i, row player i is matched with column player i, and in stage j, 
row player i is matched with column player (i + j - 1) (mod n). Notice that, to avoid
repetition, at least ten players are needed. This matching sequence is announced to all 
subjects, and they are informed that the labels (e.g. row player i) are assigned randomly 
so that they cannot identify any of the players by their labels. 
The information structure is controlled in a special way. In each stage players make 
their choices simultaneously. After everyone has moved, the row and column players are 
told what move their opponents at that stage chose. However, only the row players are 
told their payoff for that stage (they can infer it anyway from their knowledge of the 
drawn game). Since the column players were initially uninformed, and do not see their 
payoff they cannot infer directly which game was played. Play then proceeds to the next 
stage. After being rematched, each row player is informed of the history of the moves of 
other row players when they had previously played his current column player opponent. 
Thus for each pair, in each stage, the column player's past observations of row player 
moves is common knowledge to both players. The row player is not informed of the 
current column player's past moves, nor is the column player informed of the current row 
player's past moves. This information structure permits the row player to (in principle) 
infer the current column player opponent's updated belief of whether the actual game 
being played uses payoff game I or II, under the maintained hypothesis that earlier games 
followed Bayesian equilibrium play. 
After the last stage (5) game is over, the payoff table is revealed to the column players 
and all subjects record their earnings. Subjects are then randomly reassigned player 
number labels (but row players remain row players, and column players remain column 
players). A second 5-stage game is then played in exactly the same manner as the previous 
one. A new payoff table is drawn according to the probability 71', independently from the 
past draws. The matching sequence is done in the same manner (but anonymously, since 
labels have been randomly shuffled), and so on. Over the course of each experimental 
session, we conduct a total of ten 5-stage games in exactly this manner. After the tenth 
5-stage game, subjects are paid in private, one at a time, in a separate room. 
All of the above information is publicly announced to the subjects, by reading the 
instructions aloud at the beginning of the session. Following the instruction periods, sub­
jects were led step-by-step through a series of exercises to assure that they understood the 
information structure, the matching rule, how they would be paid, and the keyboard and 
record-keeping tasks. See Appendix A for all the details. The sessions were conducted on 
a network of computer terminals at the Caltech Laboratory of Experimental Economics 
and Political Science, using Caltech undergraduate students. No subject participated in 
more than one session. A total of two sessions were conducted using twenty six different 
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subjects. 
2.3 EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES AND BELIEFS: 
The Bayesian equilibrium of the 5-stage repeated game can be calculated by separately 
computing the equilibrium of an arbitrary stage s, depending on the prior 7r s of a col­
umn player at stage s. The reason each stage can be treated independently (after ac­
counting for the updating of the beliefs 7r8) is that our rotation and information struc­
ture isolates the strategic calculations of each stage. There is no role for signalling 
equilibria and reputational phenomena. Thus, for stage s, we index the strategies by 
the prior of the column player, say 7r8 that game I is currently being played. Denote: 
q(7rs)= column player's mixed strategy [prob(L)].
pl(7r,)= row player's mixed strategy [prob(U)] if game I. 
p2(7rs)= row player's mixed strategy [prob(U)] if game IL 
Finally, let 'lrs+J = 'l3(7r,, a8) define the Bayes updating rule for a column player who 
started period s with prior s, and observed the matched row opponent make move a,. 
Of course, 7r1 = 7r, the common knowledge probability announced in the instructions.
Thus to compute the equilibrium at stage s if the current prior on game I is 7r,, we 
simply compute the (unique) one-shot Bayesian equilibrium given 7r,, and then at stage 
( s + 1 ), we perform a similar derivation, except that we use the posterior 7r s+I = 'B( 7r., D) 
or 7r,+1 = 'l3(7r,, U), depending on the row player's realized move at stages.
Notice that in the laboratory sessions, several games are played simultaneously, so 
(except for stage 1) different pairs of players matched in stage s may have different 
common knowledge prior of the column player that they are playing game I, depending 
on a column player's observations of moves by earlier row players. Recall that the design 
calls for row players to be told their current column opponent's past observations of moves 
by other row players, which (in theory) preserves common knowledge of the current belief. 
The actual derivation of equilibrium proceeds by establishing three facts, each of 
which may be verified by the reader. First denote b = al/( al+ a2), and assume that 
b =F 7r. 3 The three facts are: 
1. There is no pure strategy equilibrium.
2. For all values of 7r, the column player is mixing.
3. For all values"oL7r, ".exactly one. row .type"mixes.
From these facts, one can easily compute the unique equilibrium of the game, and com­
pute the updating rule, 'lrs+J = 'l3(7r.,a8). This is summarized below. 
3If b = 71", the equilibrium is indeterminate. 
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q(11"s)=b 
P1(7rs) = 1 
if 11"8 E [O, b) ===} Pz(11"s) = t=:! 
'li"s+I = �(11"., as)= 1-;+� if as = u
'li"s+i = �(11".,as) = 0 if as = D 
q(11"s) = 1 -b 
P1(7rs) = � 
if 11"8E(b,1] ===} Pz(11"s) = 1 
?rs+l = Q3(7rs,as) = 1+t-1!" if as= u
'li"s+i = �(11".,as) = 1 if as= D 
There are several noteworthy features of the equilibrium and the updating rule. First, 
the uninformed player acts "as if" he were informed. That is, if 11" s is sufficiently large 
(11"8 > b), his strategy is exactly the same as if 11" = 1 was common knowledge. If 11" is 
sufficiently low, the reverse is true. Second, only hybrid equilibria (one type mixes, the 
other doesn't) can arise. This has two interesting implications. First, it implies a zero 
likelihood problem: some moves are predicted to never be played by some types of row 
players. Second, beliefs are updated sharply following some moves, since the mixing type 
is using a strategy that the non-mixing type never uses. When 'li"s is low, a choice of 
D reveals that it is game II, and when 'li"s is high, a choice of D reveals that it is game 
I. Both of these implications point to the overly strong restrictions implied by Bayesian 
equilibrium. The first has to do with overly strong restrictions on actions, while the 
second has to do with overly strong restrictions on beliefs. What we propose below are 
some alternative models for coming to grips with these problems. 
3 MODELING IMPERFECT BEHAVIOR 
3.1 ERRORS IN ACTIONS: 
The maintained model is that at each time period, an individual may tremble and ran­
domly choose a move from the menu of moves available to him/her. We allow this 
tremble rate to change over time. Technically, we introduce the sequence Et = probabil­
ity of tremble = t0e"'1• The changing probability of trembling implied by the parameter
a is intended to capture the learning by doing component of the agents' behavior. If 
a > 0, then error rates are declining over time. In what follows, we suppress dependence 
on t, and write the strategies and updating rules as a function of E. It is convenient to 
define: 
E = 
t(l - 2b) 
2 - 2E 
MODEL S, THE SOPHISTICATED MODEL: 
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The first model we introduce is the "perfectly rational" extension of the previous 
model where the agents take into consideration that both their opponents and they 
themselves may tremble at any move with probability t, and incorporate that into their 
strategies. Straightforward analysis yields the following equilibrium strategies. 
{ q(1rs) = 1 
if E > 2b ===} p1(1rs) = 1 
p2(1rs) = 1 
if t < 2b and 7r -s < b - E ===> pl(7r,) = 1 
{ q( 1rs) = b -E 
P2(1rs) = l±E-b 1-'lrs 
if t < 2b and 11"-S > b-E ===> pl(7rs) = b�� { q(1rs) = 1-b+E 
p2(1rs) = 1 
Notice that if t is sufficiently large relative to b, there is a pure strategy equilibrium 
at (U, L) which does not permit the uninformed players to update.
MODEL U: THE UNSOPHISTICATED MODEL: 
This model does not allow the players to take the t into account when constructing 
their strategies. the resulting strategies are: 
{ q(1rs)=b 
if 1rs E [O,b) ===> P1(1rs) = 1 
( ) 1-b P2 1rs = l-11" 
The unsophisticated model has the same equilibrium as t = 0, since errors are not 
taken into account when formulating strategies. Nevertheless, different patters of play are 
predicted under the unsophisticated model if t > 0, since observed mixing probabilities 
will be closer to .5. 
3.2 ERRORS IN·BELTEFS 
MODEL F,  FAST (UNDAMPENED) UPDATING:
This model uses the Bayes updating map to update from observed row player moves 
under the assumption that trembles cannot occur. For models SF (i.e. sophisticated
strategies, fast updating) and UF (i.e. unsophisticated strategies, fast updating) the
updating rule is: 
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if 1rs E [O, b] ==? { 
if 1rs E [b, l] ==? { 
11"s+l = Q3(1Ts,as) = 1_;+11" 
1rs+I = �(7r.,a8) = 0 
7fs+l = Q3(7rs,as) = 1+t-1r 
?rs+l = Q3(7r5,a5) = 1 
if a,=U 
if a8=D 
if a,=U 
if a.=D 
Notice that model F is only correct when E = 0. 
MODEL D, DAMPENED UPDATING: 
This model uses the Bayes updating map taking into consideration the fact that the 
observed row player moves may have resulted from trembles. This updating rule will 
be different for models S and U. For model SD (i.e. sophisticated strategies, dampened 
updating), the updating rule is: 
if E > 2b ==? { 1rs+I = �(?r.,as) = 1rs
if E < 2b and 7r - s < b - E ==? s+I - " 8 - (1-<)(H,,.,-b+E)+</2 
1 a,= { 7r �( 7r a ) ,,.,(l-</2) 'f U - - ?rs+!= �(7r,,a,) = (1-<)(b=�'f�E)+</2 if a,=D
'f < 2b d - b - E _____.._ s+I - " s - (1-<)(1-1",+b-E +</2 s-{ 7r �(7r a ) ,,.,((1-<)(b-E)/,,.,+,/2l if a U l E - an 7r S > --r - ( ) - 1rs l-€ 1- b-E 1rs +t.: 2 , -1rs+J � 7r,, a, (l-<)(,,.,+E-b)+</2 1f a8 D 
For model UD (i.e. unsophisticated strategies, dampened updating), the updating 
rule is: 
if 7r, E [O, b] ==? { 
if 1rs E [b, l] ==? { 
�( ) ,,.,(1-</2) 1rs+I = 7r,, a, = (l-<)(1-b+,,.,))+</2
"'( ) ,,.,42 1rs+I = :<> 7r,, as = (l-<)(b-1",)+</2 
_ �( ) _ b(l-<)+1"x</2 1rs+1 - 1rso as - !-<) Hb-,,.,))+</2 
�( ) 1rs-b 1-f +7rsf 2 1rs+1 = 7r,, a, = (1-<)(,,.,-b)+</2
Notice that model D is "correct" updating for all values of E. 
MODEL N, NO UPDATING: 
if a.=U 
if a,=D 
if a,=U 
if a,=D 
The final model of updating that we consider is the completely myopic one where the 
players do notlean1'from observations-and -maintain theilhinitial,belief 7r1 = 7r throughout 
the stages s = 1, ...  , 5. The updating rule for the two models SN (i.e. sophisticated
strategies, no updating), and UN (i.e. unsophisticated strategies, no updating) is simply: 
Model N is correct only if E = 1. 
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4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
4.1 BAYESIAN ECONOMETRIC METHOD 
Now, we have a total of six models which we have labeled SN, UN, SD, UD, SF, UF. 
The first letter (S or U) refers to whether the model assumes that agents incorporate 
the tremble probabilities in forming their strategies (denoted by S for sophisticated), 
or ignore them (denoted U for unsophisticated). The second .Jetter .JN, J/,pr. F) refers 
to whether the model assumes that agents do no updating at all (denoted N for no 
updating), use Bayes updating but dampened by the tremble probabilities (denoted D 
for dampened updating), or use Bayes updating under the assumption that no trembles 
can occur (denoted F for fast updating).4 
As in subsection 2.3 above, the equilibrium strategic behavior under all the models 
can be indexed by the beliefs of the column (uninformed players) at time s that game 
I is being played (which we label 11",, being updated over the five stages of the game 
using the appropriate updating rule N, D, or F). For each column player, we observe that 
player's five moves, and the moves of his 5 row opponent (a total of 10 data points) for 
each round. We ran two experimental sessions. The first session had sixteen subjects. 
Therefore, we had 8 column subjects playing 10 rounds each, with each round generating 
10 data points. Hence, we had 800 data points from that first session. The second 
session had 10 subjects, i.e., 5 column subjects, and hence generated 500 data points. 
The first experimental session was conducted with 1l" = 1/6, and payoffs a1 = $.25, and 
a2 = $ 1.00. The second experimental session was conducted with 1l" = 0.2, and payoffs 
ai = $.50, and a2 = $. 75. The results shown later in the section show robustness to 
the values of 11", a1, a2, resulting in almost identical results for both sessions separately. 
We, therefore, confine attention below to the aggregate analysis of the pooled data set. 
Notice that again by our discussion of subsection 2.3 above, once we condition on the 
belief 1l" s of each column player at each stage s (which is directly computable since we 
know 11"1 = 11", and the sequence of row-opponent moves that he observes), all 1300 data 
points that we have can be treated as i.i.d. draws5 from the appropriate strategies q(1r,) 
and either p1(1r,) or p2(1r,) depending on whether game I or II was being played. 
For each model IJ (I=S,U; and J=N,D,F), denote the strategies of the players under 
that model by qIJ(1r,), PF(1r,), and p�J(1r,), and denote the updating rule by �IJ(1r,, a,) .
Then, given data for n column players, we compute the likelihood under model IJ of the 
data generated in all n x 50 games ( n players times 5 stages times 10 rounds) by: 
1 o.3 n 10 5 
Like1J(1r) = j j II II Il[(l- Eoe'")ProbIJ{a��lumni1rrs} + Eoe'"/2] 
0 0 player=l r=l s=l 
4The SD and SN models correspond to the "sequential" and "non-sequential" models of El-Gama! 
et al. (1991), respectively. 
5This also embodies an implicit assumption of homogeneity of error rates ( E) and learning rates (a) 
across subjects. Allowing for heterogeneity was not computationally feasible. 
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X [(1 - £oe'")ProbIJ { a��w11"rs} +toe"' /2] prior( dto, da)
where r indexes the rounds 1,. ..  ,10; s indexes the stages 1, ...  ,5; the tremble probability 
in round r is the same for all players and defined by the learning by doing model Er =
toe'"; a��w is (U or D) the appropriate row player's action in round r and stage s; and
a��lumn is (L or R) the appropriate row player's action in round r and stage s. 11"rs is 
the appropriate column player's belief in stage s of round r, which is set at each stage 1 
at 11"r1 = 11", and then updated using 11"r,s+l = Q3IJ(11"rs;a��w). All variables-are of course 
indexed by the column players 1, ... ,n but that dependence has been suppressed in the 
above equation since no confusion can arise. The probabilities ProbIJ {.} are computed 
using the Bayes-Nash strategies under model IJ. For instance ProbIJ {U; 7r,,} = PF(1rs) 
if game I was played and p�J(1rs) if game II was played; Prob1J{R;1rrs} = 1 - q1J(1rs), 
and so on. 
After evaluating the likelihoods of our six models LikeIJ, for I = U, S, and J =
N, D, F, we can compare each of the models to the other five by computing the posterior 
odds ratio. The posterior odds for model I J are simply LikeIJ / "Li=U,s;j=N,D,F Likeij. 
This measures the relative likelihood of model I J within the collection of models that 
we consider. 
4.2 RESULTS 
The following table lists the likelihoods for all six models that we study using all 1300 
data points. 
u 
s 
MODEL LIKELIHOODS 
N D F 
8.8 x 10-355 2 x 10-355 1 x 10-358 
4.8 x 10-373 4. 1 x 10-373 1.9 x 10-377 
The following table shows the posterior odds discussed in the previous subsection. 
u 
s 
MODEL ODDS 
N D 
0.815 0.185 
4.4 x 10-19 3.7 x 10-19 
F 
9.3 x 10-5 
1.8 x 10-23 
It is clear that only unsophisticated models have credibility within the class of six models 
that we analyze. Moreover, model UN (which assumes the least sophistication in updat­
ing) seems to be about 4. 4 times as likely as model UD, suggesting that models can be
1 1  
ranked according to their degree of sophistication. While UF significantly outperforms 
all of the sophisticated models, it performs poorly within the class of unsophisticated 
models. Indeed, a quick look at the two tables above shows that model can be monoton­
ically ranked with less sophistication always being better than more (U uniformly beats 
S), and with slower or no updating always dominates fast updating (N uniformly beats
D which in turn uniformly beats F).
Appendix B contains six figures depicting the joint posterior on (t0,a) under each of
the models. Since we started with uniform priors on those nuisance parameters, those 
posteriors are simply the likelihood function at each (to, a) under each of the models
normalized to integrate to 1. It is clear from the pictures that all the models concentrate 
our posterior belief on to, the initial rate of trembling, around 0.7, with the exception of 
model SF which has the posterior concentrated at a value of to above 0.8. The striking 
difference between the models in terms of posterior beliefs on the nuisance parameters 
is between the unsophisticated (U) models on the one hand, and the sophisticated (S) 
models on the other. All the sophisticated models concentrate our beliefs on a, the 
exponential rate of learning by doing, at zero. This means that the rate of trembling 
does not decline over time. This will typically happen when the strategic model fails 
to explain the behavior of the subjects, and it becomes easier to explain their behavior 
by trembles. For the unsophisticated models, our posterior belief on a seems to be 
concentrated around 0.1. This means that we believe that the subjects start the session 
trembling around 70% of the time, and end up trembling around 26% of the time by the 
10th round. 
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS: 
We introduced a simple repeated game with one-sided incomplete information to study 
models which allow for deviations for perfect rationality. We introduced the probability 
of players making errors in actions, and studied deviations from Bayes-Nash behavior in 
two dimensions. On the first dimension, we developed two models where players take or 
do not take into account the errors in action when formulating their optimal responses. 
On the second dimension, we developed three models where players use Bayes updating 
ignoring the errors in actions, use Bayes updating taking account of the errors in actions, 
and do not use any updating. The results from the experimental data show that on both 
dimensions, less sophisticated models perform better than the more sophisticated ones. 
This ranking is particularly strong along the dimension of optimal response formulation 
(where the computational cost of incorporating the errors in action is more pronounced),
the unsophisticated model very impressively outperforms the sophisticated. 
As usual with all experimental work, the results may be limited to the class of games 
that we looked at. It would be interesting to investigate if similar results obtain in 
different environments. In fact some of the findings here are probably true for a very 
\vide class of experimental games. For example, the estimate of a > 0, reflecting learning­
by-doing, was also recovered in McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) and El-Gama! et al. (1991), 
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and is supported widely in informal data analysis of most game experiments. 
Proceeding cautiously, we hope the reader is left with two strong messages from our 
results. The first is methodological, and states that the manner in which imperfect be­
havior in experimental games is introduced is quite non-trivial, and can lead to different 
conclusions. Nevertheless, rigorous statistical analysis of the data is both feasible and 
worth doing. Clearly more investigation of alternative ways to statistically model these 
imperfections is an important job for future theoretical and experimental research. The 
second is theoretical, and states that it is unreasonable to assume too much rationality 
on the part of players. This is true not only because of the unreasonbly strong statisti­
cal restrictions implied by full rationality, but for substantive reasons as well. Further 
synthesis of experimental and modeling techniques to uncover useful and theoretically 
sound ways to incorporate limited rationality seems to be a useful direction to proceed. 
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APPENDIX A 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXPERIMENTAL PARTICIPANTS 
This is an experiment in human decision making under uncertainty. As you entered 
the room, you were randomly assigned a seat. If your seat is on the middle isle of the 
room, you are an "A" participant and will be one for the duration of this experiment. 
If your seat is on one of the outside isles of the room, you are a "B" participant and 
will be one for the duration of this experiment. The instructions ar� ·slightly different
for A participants and B participants. You should make sure that you understand the 
instructions for both A and B participants since your payoff will depend on your actions, 
and the actions of participants of the other type. The experiment will have 10 rounds, 
each round consisting of 5 periods. 
FEEL FREE TO RAISE YOUR HAND AND ASK QUESTIONS AT ANY POINT. MAKE 
SURE THAT YOU UNDERSTAND THE INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE THE EXPERIMENT BEGINS. 
IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS DURING THE EXPERIMENT, FEEL FREE TO R AISE YOUR 
HAND AND ASK THE EXPERIMENTER WHO WILL BE PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE EX­
PERIMENT, AND WILL ANSWER YOUR QUESTION PRIVATELY. 
AT NO POINT DURING THE INSTRUCTIONS PERIOD OR DURING THE EXPERIMENT 
ARE YOU ALLOWED TO COMMUNICATE IN ANY WAY WITH OTHER PARTICIPANTS. 
In each period of each round, each A participant will be matched with a B participant. 
A participants will be asked to choose either left (L) or right (R). B participants will be 
asked to choose either up (U) or down (D). The two moves of the A and the B participants 
determine their payoffs for that period of that round according to one of the following 
two payoff tables: (show transparency 1)
Two out of ten chance: PAYOFF TABLE I 
B participant 
chooses U 
B participant 
chooses D 
A participant chooses L A participant chooses R 
A gets $0.75 A gets $0.00 
B gets $0.00 B gets $0.75 
A gets $0.00 A gets $0.50 
B gets $0.50 B gets $0.00 
eight out of ten chance: PAYOFF TABLE II 
B participant 
chooses U 
B participant 
chooses D 
A participant chooses L A participant chooses R 
A gets $0.00 A gets $0.50 
B gets $0.75 B gets $0.00 
A gets $0.75 A gets $0.00 
B gets $0.00 B gets $0.50 
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For example, if the relevant payoff table turns out to be Table I, and if you are participant 
A3, matched with participant B2, and if you choose L, and B2 chooses D, then you get 
$0.00, and participant B2 gets $0.50. For a second example, if the relevant payoff table 
turns out to be Table II, and if you are participant B5, matched with participant Al, and 
if you choose U, and participant Al chooses L, then you get $0.75, and Al gets $0.00. 
At the beginning of each round, one of the two payoff tables will be chosen at random 
by rolling a fair 10-sided die. If the outcome is 0 or 1, the first payoff table will be used 
for that round, otherwise, (if the outcome is 2,3,4,5,6,7,8, or 9) the second payoff table 
will be used for that round. All B participants will then be informed of the relevant 
payoff table for the round as soon as the die is rolled. The die will be rolled so one of 
the B participants can verify the outcome. The A participants will not be informed of 
the relevant payoff table until the end of the round. 
At the beginning of each round, new identity numbers will be randomly assigned to 
both A and B participants. For the duration of that round, you will be referred to by 
your type (A or B), and your number. For instance, if you are an A participant, you may
be Al, A2, ... etc. If you are a B participant, you may be Bl, B2, ... etc. (Remember that 
your letter (A or B) remains the same all the time, but your number may be different 
from round to round.) Each A participant is assigned one white sheet, one red sheet, 
and 5 green slips. The white sheet contains the following table to be filled by each A 
participant (show transparency 2): 
WHITE SHEET FOR Name ID:A-
ROUND 1 MY MY MOVE MATCH's PAYOFF 
PERIODS MATCH L or R U or D in $ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
TOTAL PAYOFF THIS ROUND IS: 
The red sheet contains the following table to be filled by the B participants with whom 
our A participant is matched at each period: 
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RED SHEET FOR A-
My B's 
PERIODS MATCH Moves 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
The green slips each contains one cell, and they are to be filled by the A participant. 
I GREEN SLIP FOR PARTICIPANT A- I 
I Period I MY MOVE(L or R) I 
To each B player is assigned a white sheet to be filled out by the B participants: 
WHITE SHEET FOR NAME ID: B-
ROUND 1 MY MY MOVE MATCH's PAYOFF 
PERIODS MATCH U or D L or R in $ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
TOTAL PAYOFF THIS ROUND IS: 
Since participant.s are randomly a.s.signed new identity number.s in each round, you 
will never know the participant with whom you are matched. 
In each round, the following sequence of events occurs: 
1. The round begins.
2. Participant identity numbers are randomly drawn. Everyone is informed of their
own identity number but no one else's.
3. The relevant payoff matrix is randomly determined by rolling a 6-sided die, the
B participants are informed of the relevant payoff table (it is the table with the
highlighted background) for that round.
4. The first period begins. During that period:
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(a) The A participants enter their move (L or R) at the flashing sign on their 
green slip (the green slip disappears from the A participant's). 
(b) The relevant A participant's red sheet appears on each B participant's screen. 
The B participants enter their move (U or D) at the flashing sign on the red 
sheet of the relevant A participants. 
( c) After all participants have made their moves, all moves are automatically 
recorded on the white sheets of A and B participants. 
( d) The B participants will see their payoffs after each period whereas the A 
participants will only be informed of their payoffs at the very end of the round 
when the relevant payoff table is revealed. 
( e) The first period ends. 
5. The second period begins. The same procedure is followed.
6. The third period begins. The same procedure is followed.
7. The fourth period begins. The same procedure is followed.
8. The fifth period begins. The same procedure is followed.
9. The round ends.
10. The relevant payoff table for this round is revealed. The white sheets now show
your total payoff for this round as well as your payoff for each period. Copy your
total payoff for this round onto the record sheet.
There will be 10 such rounds. 
Now, instruct participants to turn on their computers, and follow instructions. First 
we shall walk you through a practice round, you will not be paid for this practice round. 
The practice round will be conducted both on the computers and using actual paper 
sheets and slips. Follow the instructions of the experimenter and do not write anything 
on the sheets or the computers until instructed to do so. During the practice round, the 
experimenter will tell you what choices to make, make exactly those choices. 
first period: DR, second period: UL, third period: UR, fourth period: DL, fifth 
period: DR. 
The practice .round is. over, check payoffs, .etc. Get ready. for...starting the actual 
experiments. Remember that the experiment will have 10 rounds like the one you just 
witnessed. You will be paid what you earn for all 10 rounds. In the actual experiment, 
you will use the computers only (no sheets of paper will be used). 
Outcomes of practice round if the first table is drawn (show transparency 3). Out­
comes of practice round if the second table is drawn (show transparency 4). 
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APPENDIX B 
POSTERIORS ON ( Eo, a) UNDER THE SIX MODELS
1000 pml 
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Figure 1: Posterior under Model SN. Figure 2: Posterior under Model 
UN. 
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Figure 3: Posterior under Model SD. 
Figure 5: Posterior under Model SF. 
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Figure 4: Posterior under Model 
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Figure 6: Posterior under Model 
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